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IDEOLOGY AND RATIONALITY IN ROMANIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
by 
Steven L. Sampson 
Introduction 
.An essential aspect of Romania's drive for "multilateral devel-
opment" is the spatial reorganization of the countryside called 
sistematizare ("systematization"). Codified by law and augmented by 
directives, systematization encompasses several programs, one being the 
conversion over the next decade of 300 villages into small urban centers. 
My research in Romania focused on the planned urbanization of one such 
village, called Feldioara (pronounced Fel-dee-WAH-ra), and the relation 
between the national planning structure, the regional planners and the 
local social organization. 
As I analyzed my field data from Feldioara, I noticed that, as in most 
instances of social change, dysfunctions existed between the planning 
timetable and formal ideology and the realities of local social processes. 
The plan seemed to have been formulated chiefly to serve ilmnigrant 
industrial workers, while undercutting or ignoring the locally born 
villagers; there were problems in communicating the plan to the local 
residents; changes occurred that had not been anticipated by the planners. 
I endeavored to show that the local leaders were in some ways unrepre-
sentative of the total population, lacking both sources of local 
information and legitimacy in local eyes. Their difficulties in mobilizing 
the population to execute the plan drew the ire of regional authorities. 
Finally, the village appeared fragmented by its demographic and 
occupational composition, ethnic groups, and household and individual 
mobility strategies. 
The explanations I developed to account for the realities of 
urbanization in Feldioara all had one point of departure: the village 
itself. That is, the dysfunctions reflected a clash of interests between 
the plan and the village, caused by the planners' not having taken account 
of the realities of local social structure. I dichotomized the situation 
into "what the state wants" versus "what the village wants." Thus, on 
certain occasions, I postulated that there would be congruent interests 
which would result in the success of the plan; on others contradictory 
interests would result in delays, apathy, resistance, or outright failure. 
The clash between plan and village was caused by inflexibility at higher 
levels. Had'the planners considered specific local factors, I thought, the 
unanticipated, unexpected or unwanted changes might have been mitigated, 
if not checked. 
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On further consideration, however, I was forced to revise this rather 
straightforward explanation. Rather than treating the village as an entity 
within the state, I had been treating village and state as two separate and 
distinct structures. Although I had described the interaction between the 
planning institution and the village community, I had not linked them 
together systematically. I had been holding the plan outside the 
explanatory framework, treating it as a given rather than incorporating it 
as a variable within the structure. Thus, I could account for the plan's 
manifestations, but not for the structural causes underlying these 
manifestations. These causes lay as much in the nature of the supralocal 
planning structure and the planners' ideologies as in the vagaries of local 
social organization. 
stated more simply, I discovered that planning activities and the 
articulation of the plan by the planners demanded social and ideological 
analysis in their own right. Just as Gluckman (1964) had criticized 
British anthropologists for artificially closing their systems when they 
reached the level of district officer, and just as Schapera (1938) had 
noted our neglect of "missionary, administrator, trader and labOr recruiter 
as factors in tribal life equally important as the chief and the magician" 
(p. 315), so also had I closed off my analysis of Feldioara by not 
analyzing the planners and the planning process. I had mentioned them, 
described the plan, and taken note of their roles, but I had not 
incorporated them into the explanation of what actually took place in 
Feldioara. 
As the reader has no dOUbt gathered by now, this paper seeks to 
redress this shortcoming by making the planners and plan just as important 
a part of local social process as household cycles and ethnic composition. 
Feldioara was not just confronted by a hard and fast plan, but by a plan 
which had been sUbjected to higher level constraints and ideological 
"filters" of national and regional planners, party officials and activists, 
local elites and citizens. Although the plan was to produce social 
transformation at the village level, it was itself being transformed by 
supralocal structures and local elites. 
Shifting my focus from the community's reaction to planning to 
analysis of the plan as technical, social and ideological activity meant 
that the significance of village level factors in explaining locally 
observed phenomena gave way to more important supralocal structures (in 
bOth their institutionalized and noninstitutionalized forms). More 
specifically, I became concerned with the various constraints and 
ideologies which transformed the plan before it reached the village. 
The following analysis will elabOrate this hierarchy of structural 
constraints and ideologies into a model of socialist planning. Examples 
from Romania's systematization policy and from Feldioara's urbanization 
will serve to depict how these constraints operate in real communiti~s. 
Thus, rather than closing off the analysis at the socialist equivalent of 
the district officer, I will try to follow Gluckman's and Schapera's 
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advice. BIIildi.)l,] on recent trends in European anthropology, I will try not 
only to bridge the artificially created gap between the local community and 
the wider society, but as Vincent (1977) suggests, attempt to do away with 
it altogether. 
A Model for Soc~~lis~Regional Planning in Romania 
The regional planning process in Romania consists of a hierarchical 
arrangement of structural constraints, each of which transforms the plan as 
it proceeds to the next lower level. At the level of the state there are 
three types of constraints: 
1) those common to planning in general; 
2) those produced by "socialist" elements in planning, where 
"socialism" is defined, after Bahro (1978) as "socialism 
as it actually exists;" and 
3) specifically "Romanian" constraints which reflect national 
priorities. 
These three aspects--the "general," the "socialist," and the 
"Romanian"--comprise the highest level of the plan, but they also manifest 
themselves in regional and local level processes. The plan is further 
transformed by the planners' own "ideologies" or "cultures;" planners, 
representatives of various interest groups (economic, regional, 
professional or ethnic), impose their own role perceptions, personal 
strategies and attitudes upon the plan in both its formulation and 
execution. 
At the regional level the plan is influenced by factors specific to 
that region's position in the national polity and economy: historical 
relations between the region and central authority, existing economic 
development, geographic factors, ethnic composition and the region's future 
role as seen by central authorities. The regional level planners and 
county officials modify the plan as they implement it, transmitting it 
downward and feeding results back up to the capital. 
At the village level the planners must deal with the community's 
idiosyncratic "history." To succeed, the county planners and regional and 
local elites must adjust the plan to the characteristics of local social 
organization. The plan is both mediated and manipulated by local elites 
and party activists according to their own ideologies and interests. 
The plan reaches its public alre~('ly manifesting these prior 
constraints; the public must then be mobilized to perform voluntary labor, 
hold,meetings, and contract for services. Since the villagers are not a 
homogeneous mass but a diverse agglomeration of households, social and 
occupational groups (which may not merit the designation "community"), they 
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too will seek to transform the plan either by ignoring it, resisting it, 
accepting it enthusiastically or actively molding it to their own ends. 
Planning activities at the local level can thus range from complete success 
to total failure. 
The aoove model, which will now be detailed, infers that the village 
does not react to the original plan as such, but rather to the plan as 
altered by the transformations. Not realizing this, officials at higher 
levels may be dismayed by what they see as chaos, indiscipline or poor 
leadership at local levels. In actuality, this is the logical result of 
the interaction between the transformed plan, the ideologies of planners, 
officials, activists and local elites, and the local social structure. 
Before describing in detail the various structures involved, I will give 
some additional background information on Romania's territorial planning. 
Territorial Planning in Romania 
Systematization is the spatial component of Romania's economic 
development policy; it is distinct from the purely economic prognos-
tications which Romanians call planificare, though in English the two words 
would ooth be called "planning." Systematization is one of the physical 
manifestations of socialist development, the "harmonious and judicious 
distribution of productive forces over the entire territory of the country" 
(Blaga,1974:34). It is both an objective necessity and a prerequisite for 
future economic growth in Romania. 
Systematization seeks to develop backward areas, to establish new 
rural/urban hierarchies, and to transform individual localities either by 
expanding them or in some cases eliminating them altogether. As formulated 
in the early 1970's, the systematization law (Law no. 5/1974), stipulates a 
spatial and economic plan for each locality in the country. Under the 
plan, Bucharest and the largest cities will exhibit controlled population 
growth, so as to avoid the overcrowding of Third World cities. The middle 
rank of urban settlements will be upgraded to "optimal" populations of 
between 50,000 and 200,000 persons. In the rural areas, 300 of Romania's 
13,000 villages will be turned into towns during the next decade (for more 
detail on selection criteria see Miftode, 1978 and Sampson, 1980, Ch. 5). 
Another 150 villages will be turned into showcase "model villages" with new 
social, educational and medical facilities, utilities and tourist 
facilities. For thousands of other villages, improvements will be only 
gradual, with greater reliance placed on local initiative rather than state 
investment. Finally, at the lowest level of the settlement hierarchy, 
between 3,000 and 6,000 villages will be consolidated or phased out over 
time (Lazarescu, 1978, Gheorghe and Gheorghe, 1978). The latter action, 
involving about 15 percent of the rural population, will affect those 
villages in the path of hydroelectric projects, those too close to 
polluting factories, and hundreds of small, isolated, dispersed moun~ain 
hamlets judged to be "without perspectives for development." 
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In addition, systematization mandates strict guidelines for land use, 
housing construction and population control. Zoning specifications 
establish urban-style "civic centers" in each village and demand 
consolidation of housing within a strictly defined village perimeter. All 
new housing construction must be at least two stories in villages, and four 
stories in village civic centers and in all cities; housing lots are 
restricted to 250 m2 in villages, 150 m2 in future new towns, and 100 m2 in 
cities. 
Other directives stipulate rural-urban commuting (for rurally based 
workers living within 30 km of their urban jobS) as opposed to urban 
migration. Under systematization each locality will have its particular 
place in Romania's socialist settlement network. This is assured by 
investment priorities which earmark funds for specific localities, where 
cities and future urban centers are the preferred settlement units. 
One of these future towns is Feldioara, located 22 km north of Bra?ov, 
and situated along main road and rail lines. Feldioara was selected for 
urbanization for several reasons: its geographic proximity to Bra~ov has 
led it to become a dormitory settlement for workers unable to find housing 
in the city; the northern Bra~ov zone needed a minor central place for 
administrative and service functions; and most importantly, a large mineral 
extraction plant was under construction just outside the village, with the 
workers to be housed in Feldioara. Under the plan the population will 
increase from 3,000 to 7,000 by 1990. Several hundred apartments have been 
built and more are under construction. A polyclinic, new elementary 
school, reprofiled high school, new culture house, sports complex and new 
stores and services will eventually come to the new town. 
Since 1970, when national directives were issued to assess development 
possibilities for each rural locality, Feldioara has been in continuous 
contact with state and regional level planners. Its status as future town 
is known to virtually all villagers. with this background information, we 
can now examine the constraints to planning in general, to socialist 
planning, and to specifically Romanian planning, which have helped shape 
Feldioara's plan, both in its formation and in its execution. 
The Systematization Law and the Constraints of Planning in General 
Regional planning is performed by human beings working under conscious 
and unconscious constraints; it is not just a technical activity but 
assumes sociological and ideological aspects as well. Planners' ideologies 
and planning policies are products of their professional expertise, 
political beliefs, the institutions they work for, their views about how 
plans should be formed and their experience in implementing them. Like all 
plans, systematization expresses the ideology of "interventionism": through 
direct purposeful endeavor human beings can control or steer the forces of 
change, creating a world in their own image. The planners' training and 
expertise give them both access to and control over information. And 
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becau,:;,::, t~'.J l?lans themselves are an ideological expression of the future, 
the planners control and manipulate these symbols. 
Spatial planners are often beset with "architectural determinism" or 
"physical planning bias," in that they view physical change in the 
environment as the prime factor in determining the social and economic 
destinies of those who live in that environment. Architectural determinism 
is particularly prevalent where planners control only that domain of 
activity, being without voice in deciding allocations of land, labor, and 
capital (Bailey, 1975). 
Planners everywhere work from the ideology of the "public interest." 
Usually, this is expressed as a single public interest, ignoring the 
reality of conflicting interests present in society (Bailey, 1975). That 
these conflicts also occur in socialist systems has been shown by Konrad 
and Szelenyi's (1976) work on underurbanization in Hungary and by 
~aubman's description of struggles between the urban service and industrial 
p,(oduction sectors of the USSR, a conflict he describes as a case of "the 
public interest versus the public interest" (1974:176). 
Citi~en participation is essential to any kind of planning, even if it 
involves but nominal consultation with those affected, or a partial 
monitoring of the plan's progress through citizens' reactions. As Arnstein 
(1969) has pointed out, there are many degrees of "citizen participation;" 
it often happens that while citizens are talking about self-determination, 
the planners may understand participation solely as their obligation to 
inform citizens of decisions alr'Bdy made. 
Planners working in rural areas are subject to other types of 
constraints, which Cohen (1977) has called "social distance" and 
"administrative distance." Social distance stems from the cultural 
attitudes of urban-trained, urban-dwelling, metropolitan planners and their 
lack of sensitivity in dealing with the needs of rural dwellers. Planners 
see the countryside as serving the city rather than the reverse. Village 
planning schemes reflect planners' stereotyped conceptions of rural life as 
either romanticized agrarian community or cultural backwater. In either 
case, the complexities of 20th century industrialization (where a majority 
of villagers may not even be working in agriculture) are lost in the 
stereotypes. 
Administrative distance arises out of the physical distance or limited 
access between planners' offices and tll!'~ rural locality. planners may be 
responsible for several localities at a time and may be imposing 
standardized models on them. Visits to the rural areas may be too short or 
viewed as bothersome. Contrast this with the city planners' opportunity to 
casually examine or monitor their work even after formal responsibility for 
it has ended. Because planners often mistake small communities for 
socially homogeneous ones, short meetings with the mayor or local leaders 
may not reveal the genuine diver'3ities within the population. Rural 
minority interests may in fact be less articulated and less noticeable than 
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minority interests in urban localities where discontent is expected and 
various outlets for it are provided. 
When we examine Feldioara's plan specifically with relation to these 
general planning constraints, we can easily recognize the ideological and 
symbOlic value of the plan itself. While virtually all villagers know that 
one day Feldioara will be made into a city (in the sense that it will be 
officially declared one), their detailed understanding of the plan is 
limited. Whereas planners held community wide meetings in 1972, arriving 
with maps, charts, graphs and three dimensional models showing Feldioara's 
ostensible appearance as far as the year 2000, there have since been so 
many changes in the plan that most of these models are obsolete, and most 
up-to-date information is not available to the villagers. The techno-
logical elitism of the planners and the Romanian penchant for keeping 
undecided policies "secret" contribUte to the planners' virtual monopoly 
over information. There is village participation in the plan, but this is 
limited to reacting to planners' proposals and helping in plan execution, 
rather than contributing to long term goal determination. I see no 
conspiracy here~ the sheer ambitiousness of the plan discourages local 
participation in its formulation. 
The regional planners, based in Bra~ov and largely unknown in the 
village, are responsible for several communities at a time, thus adding to 
the social and administrative distance of the planners from the rural 
community of Feldioara. Standardized construction plans, established by 
Bucharest, limit variety in the planners' solutions. Feldioara is an 
example of a community with tremendous social diversity of which the 
planners are only partially aware. Over three-fourths of the work force 
are in nonagricultural occupations. Hundreds of migrants have settled in 
the village to commute to Bra~ov or work in the new factory. In the 
meantime locally born residents of Saxon-German descent have been emigra-
ting to West Germany. Thus there is not only population growth but 
population replacement. The immigrant segment is heavily represented at 
the level of local leadership. Planner consultations with village leaders 
often overlook the interests of local household agricultural producers, 
ignoring local villagers' desires to see infrastructural improvements 
spread throughout the village rather than being provided only for the 
immigrants. 
Planning documents for Feldioara reveal a striking lack of concern 
with the social consequences of 'urbanization on the community. While 
villagers recognize the tensions generated by expropriations, rebuilding 
and the immigration of hundreds of new families, the planning documents 
offer only vague suggestions, such as to establish a light industry plant 
to employ the wives of the incoming (male) factory workers. One can 
conclude that the plan for Feldioara is really only a physical plan. 
Because of this shortcoming, certain alterations or dysfunctions in the 
plan become inevitable. 
49 
Socialist societies like to distinguish themselves as "planned 
economies" where rational, consciously made decisions are the guiding 
ideology for state activity. From an examination of the experiences of 
several East European countries (see Pioro, 1965~ Fisher, 1962, 1965, 1967~ 
Sawers, 1977; KonrAd and Szel~nyi, 1976) we can isolate a core of features 
common to socialist societies' planning schemes. It could be argued that 
distinctly "socialist" planning does not exist, since any of the following 
characteristics are found in capitalist countries too. What justifies the 
"socialist" designation, however, is the configuration of these features, 
their scope, their intensity, and the dominance of a planning ideology 
throughout society. 
Periodic crises under capitalism are attributed largely to vagaries in 
the system~ they are an acceptable byproduct which the state can try to 
ameliorate bUt which just have to be lived with. In socialist societies, 
where the planning ideology is dominant, the crises or dysfunctions are 
attributed to specific causes: they can be due to poor prognosis 
(inadequate planner expertise), inadequate implementation ("poor 
leadership", "bad organization"), or resistance/apathy on the part of the 
target population ("retrograde mentality," "private interest," 
"survivals"). 
If these explanations are insufficent, one can always cite "historical 
necessity." The wealth-redistributing functions originally conceived for 
socialist planning have largely been replaced by a more important 
objective: the necessity for economic development. Because socialism has 
emerged in countries which are relatively backward economically, socialist 
planning has become a development strategy which allocates resources on the 
basis of anticipated rather than existing needs. Socialist planning is 
future-oriented, active planning; it relies on total mobilization of 
domestic resources in order to achieve rapid accumulation and economic 
growth. 
To this end, there is a priority of economic (sectoral) interests over 
territorial (i.e. regional) interests. The idea that, despite centuries of 
continuous settlement, humans have somehow arranged themselves irrationally 
permeates the regional planning strategies of socialist countries. 
Regions, cities, villages are bUt epiphenomena of the productive forces, 
changeable and expendable, as illustrated not just by Romanian systema-
tization bUt by Soviet plans to phase out 300,000 villages. Examples from 
other socialist systems include Hungary's underurbanization, Tanzania's 
Ujaama village program, Chinese rustification efforts, and the infamous 
emptying of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge (Palliot, 1977; Szel~nyi, 1976; 
Zastavskaya, 1978). Furthermore, residents can also be required to remain 
in their settlements via internal passport systems and migration 
restrictions. The future of settlements is placed under conscious 
administrative control. 
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Socialist planning articulates an ideology of regional balance as an 
expression of class equality. Homogenization (seen by westerners as 
dullness) is exhibited by standardized urban apartment neighborhoods, 
policies of eliminating town/country differences, and programs to 
industrialize backward regions. Nevertheless, the ideology of regional 
equality conflicts with the demand for rapid accumulation. High cost 
enterprises placed in backward areas may become "enterprises parasitic to 
the economy," while their villages become "irrational settlements without 
perspectives for development" (Blaga, 1974:197). Conflict between regional 
interests, which can develop into regional movements, lies below the 
surface, all the more volatile because it is unrecognized. 
The rationality of socialist planning is not only technical. Economic 
decisions assume a political character and disagreements about plan 
priorities become more than just technical debates. Challenging planner 
competency on technical grounds is one thing, but challenging planning 
goals can be a threat to socialist development itself. Planners can react 
to challenges from below by (1) invoking the ideology of public or national 
interest, or by (2) using their technical expertise and monopoly over 
information to dismiss local objections as uninformed or narrowminded. 
Since socialist planning is decided at the level of the state, in 
reality there are no local plans. There are only national plans, portions 
of which are executed in various localities. This explains why planners 
can so confidently invoke the "national interest" at any sign of local 
dissatisfaction, equating planners' interest with the national interest. 
Citizen participation under socialism is more than just the mass 
ritual we westerners have been led to believe. I would argue that for 
success, local participation is a necessity because the low level of 
economic development in most socialist countries necessitates extra 
contributions by the public. With local participation a duty and a 
necessity, dissatisfaction with the plan may cause it to go unfullfilled. 
It should also be noted that helping in the execution of a plan should be 
distinguished from helping to determine planning goals; the latter is a 
function of experts. In the same manner we should distinguish technical 
modifications in planning (decentralization) from genuine self-determinism 
by local groups. The latter is considered to be in opposition to the 
national interest and is rarely seen. 
Socialist planning depends upon a certain type of special individual 
to help implement the plans. This individual, the party activist, has 
duties which include mobilization, control, and linkage between the 
locality and higher level planning bodies. Activists are appointed for 
their political qualifications rather than their technical expertise. 
Thus, they are easily rotated from job to job depending on circumstances. 
The plan is implemented with the help of activists, but it is also mediated 
and transformed by the activists' own personal and political goals. 
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When we examine the particular instance of Feldioara with regard to 
socialist constraints, we find that the national priorities for socialist 
planning can be seen in the history of Fe1dioara's plan. Fe1dioara's 
urbanization is far from a local matter. As one of 300 future towns, 
Fe1dioara was to be developed in consort with its counterparts; the 
national scheme specified that the village would be developed during the 
first phase (to 1980). The national plan set upper limits on Feldioara's 
growth, specifying that it must not compete with other settlements. These 
upper limits became evident when local villagers requested that a small 
meat processing plant be attached to a nearby pig raising complex in order 
to siphon off some of the pork before it was transported to BraJov and to 
assure local consumption. This proposal was rejected by Brayov's planners 
on the grounds that the Feldioara butchering facility would take away 
capacity from Bra~ov's plant, thus making it irrational. This being the 
case, the pigs would continue to be shipped to Brarov, slaughtered there, 
and shipped back to the village for sale. 
The original plan contained two variants: one built new constructions 
on new lands, the other placed new buildings where housing already existed, 
thus necessitating demolition; one called for a larger number of apartments 
to be built and a greater number of services to be added in the initial (to 
1980) phase, while in the other, the number of apartments was fewer and the 
services were to be added later. 
It turned out that these choices were resolved not by local initiative 
but by directive. In 1974 a third variant, combining the first two, was 
suggested by a visiting regional party leader from Bra~ov. The eventual 
plan "chosen" in late 1975 (i.e., approved by the local Peoples' Council) 
was much like this third variant, except that the national systematization 
law had specified even further centralization (and thus some more 
demolition). In addition, a ministry decision to augment the factory work 
force necessitated more apartment construction. This decision was out of 
the locals' hands and even out of the hands of Bra§ov County's planners. 
Finally, the emphasis on productive over nonproductive investments (i.e., 
services) led to a postponement of some services until the later phases of 
the plan. Though officially approved, the plan was altered yet again, in 
1977, when President Ceausescu called for revision of new town plans to 
make them more grandiose. As planners had to act quickly, there was little 
time for renewed consultations. Many key decisions were made to 
expropriate houses and build apartments, allowing for little discussion by 
local elites, or information to affected villagers. This generated a rumor 
mill which was quite active on my return to Feldioara during summer of 
1977. 
The priority of industrial investment over settlement improvement is 
illustrated by the continuous struggle between local officials and factory 
leaders over contributions to community work brigades. The village leaders 
would complain that the factory was not sending enough workers to help 
build the local culture house, the factory would respond that if they gave 
up more laborers they would not be able to achieve their own plan. The 
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factory's power in the community was demonstrated by an incident in which 
several apartment dwellers were disappointed with the meat supplies 
available from the local butcher. Citing the limited hours, lack of stock 
and suspicion that the butcher was dealing under the counter to locals, the 
head of the apartment committee (i.e., the worker families at the new 
factory) went directly to the factory director bypassing the locai 
consumers' cooperative. In a short time, the factory director arranged 
with authorities in Bra~ov for the apartment dwellers to receive standard 
pre-packaged meat allotments. With each name written down on a list, there 
was no possibility of corruption, and no standing in line. The meat was of 
such high quality that the locals actually complained that the immigrant 
workers were getting preferential treatment. 
Urbanization under socialism is not intended to mean just physical 
construction, but must involve political decisions. In several local 
meetings, villagers and leaders were criticized by regional party activists 
for not showing enough discipline or leadership in achieving the plans on 
time. The distinction of being designated a town was not to be awarded 
automatically while citizens sat back and watched the state do everything. 
Feldioara's citizens would have to earn it by contributing voluntary labor, 
self-taxation and Sunday clean-up details, by making extra donations, by 
taking part in meetings, and by maintaining agricultural production. 
The Systematization Law and the "Romanian" Constraint 
Systematization plans are indicative of Romania'S commitment to rapid, 
self-reliant, all-around development. Exhortations to augment or finish 
the plan early, to produce more, export more, consume less~ the constant 
revisions in the plan and pleas to citizens to tighten their belts for the 
future~ the intervention by President Ceau~escu in even the most minute 
affairs of lower level units ("getting in touch with the masses") all 
contribute to the centralization, the air of uncertainty, and the stop-and-
go character of Romania's planning process. Surprises come often, and they 
can be drastic. 
Had the Ceau~escu style of leadership been different, the underlying 
structure of planning in Romania might have remained the same, since the 
hectic pace of development forces lagging sectors and regions to keep up, 
if only to save face. In such cases, Ceau~escu's excursions to factories, 
collectives, and provincial towns serve more to build morale than to 
collect on-the-spot information. This is not to deny any of Romania'S 
genuine economic achievements, but where the industrial growth rate has 
been one of the highest in the world, with a rate of accumulation of over 
30%, and where all national development policies are articulated within an 
ideology of national independence, numerous pressures build up. The 
planners, to their credit, recognize the consequent problems and accept the 
burdens in good spirit. 
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Apart from these political considerations, which should not be 
underestimated, territorial planning in Romania is characterized by four 
ideological structures: 
1. promotion of regional equality; 
2. concepts of rational and irrational settlements; 
3. emphasis on general over particular (private) interest; and 
4. necessity for voluntaristic participation in plan execution. 
In one of the most explicit statements of systematization policy, Ion 
Blaga (1974) subsumes regional development problems completely under 
national development priorities. In fact, according to Blaga there are no 
regional problems: 
Inequality of [regional] economic development, including 
industrial development ••• must be considered only as a 
partial aspect of the problem, an indication of insuffi-
cient national economic development ••• The essence of the 
problem [of regional inequality] must be put in terms of 
the general economic optimalization. They are problems of 
the entire national economy as a totality and only secon-
darily of geographic zones (1974:38). 
In speaking of homogenization between rich and poor counties, Blaga states 
categorically that "harmonious and judicious" development will not lead to 
full regional equality. 
Different possibilities determine not only different solu-
tions, but in the last analysis different levels of in-
dustrialization in different zones and localities (1974:162). 
The emphasis on economic development over regional equality is manifest in 
Romania's systematization praxis. Thus, 
The county or locality offering the highest efficiency 
will be preferred even if it is already developed 
(1974:192). 
New industries will be placed in underdeveloped zones "only if the 
efficiency they offer is greater or at least equal to the more developed 
zones" (ibid). The "inevitable outcome" of this policy, says Blaga, is the 
development of extractive industry, forestry, and tourism in underdeveloped 
zones, migration of unskilled workers into advanced areas, and immigration 
of skilled cadres (intelligentsia, engineers, teachers, etc.) into backward 
zones. 
Romania's systematization policy denies recognition of any genuine 
regional interests. Regional dissatisfaction must be subordinated t~ the 
general interest. Lower levels must "harmonize" with higher levels; they 
can never be allowed to slow down the national growth. There is "a 
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priority of the interest of all members of society rather than the interest 
of certain groups--counties, geographic zones" (Blaga,1974:39). And, 
since there is never any clear definition of what the general interest is, 
a concept which is in turn subject to political fluctuations, any 
dissatisfaction becomes a manifestation against this interest. 
Judgements about a settlement's rationality determine whether 
localities will be maintained, expanded, or abolished. While several 
"objective" criteria have been mentioned (e.g. Miftode, 1974; or Sampson, 
1980, Ch. 5), I see these criteria as reflecting two principal planning 
ideologies. The first is an extreme emphasis on centralization and 
concentration. spatial centralization must reflect the politicar--
centralization of the state, the leading role of the Party, and the 
administrative dominance of Bucharest. Each locality must fit into the 
hierarchical spatial and social structure of Romanian society. No 
settlement can compete with another. Villages lacking the requisite 
centralization are judged unsuitable for future development. This applies 
particularly to highland "tentacle" villages which line roads and river 
valleys. Optimum population for centralized villages is 3,000 (though the 
median size for Romania's villages is about 1,000). The emphasis is on the 
separation and distinctiveness of each locality. The irrational running 
together of villages and the intermeshing of town and country (what we call 
sprawl) is anathema to Romania's planners. The centralization-
concentration ideology blends well with the bigger-is-better mentality 
found in socialist planning, perhaps reflecting profound desires to achieve 
control over the population through limiting the number of settlement 
units. 
Urban orientation is the second theme which dominates planners' 
rationality criteria. The countryside is seen as the seat of back-
wardness7 the socialist city, the home of modernity, progress and 
civilization. Preference for state investment is given to urban 
localities, while state support in the rural sector is limited to loans to 
aid citizens in building homes. Urbanization also functions as a reward: 
it is hardly coincidental that President Ceausescu's home village of 
Scornicesti has been designated one of the 300 new towns. In special 
cases, the technical criteria can be waived altogether. This occurred in 
1977, when the anniversary of Romania's 1907 peasant uprising was 
celebrated by honoring the nine Moldovian villages where the revolt first 
began. In honor of their historic role, these nine localities were added 
to the list of future towns. 
In the domain of village planning, the detached one-family house, the 
large land area of peasant homesteads, and the dual functions of the home 
as residence and workplace are all seen as incompatible with the 
concentration and urbanization ideologies. Localities will progress only 
if converted into miniature cities with civic centers, functional zoning, 
vertical construction, high density buildings, and clearly marked 
recreational zones placed at the village periphery or roped off in a 
central square. 
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The apartment actually becomes the ideal residential unit because it 
is only with apartments that the state chooses to provide the hot running 
water, central heating, toilets, sewage, asphalting, and other amenities 
which all villagers desire. The rows of apartment houses indicating 
progress and modernization--which appear in so many Romanian newspapers or 
television shows--are indeed "beautiful," but their aesthetic is social 
rather than physical. It is in the apartments where one finds those 
amenities that the state will not provide to rural homes because of their 
"irrationally" large court-yards and extended construction. Bold, Matei, 
and Sabadeanu (1974) have justly criticized the planners' view of village 
homes as irrationally constructed. They give additional evidence for the 
social distance between planners and peasants. 
Romanian planners and officials justify their rationality criteria by 
showing the economies of scale obtained by installing a given utility in a 
given settlement of a given size. Nevertheless, a rationality ideology 
lies behind this apparently technical valuation. For comparison's sake we 
can look at· East Germany where, like Romania, agriculture is almost 
completely collectivized, but where half of all rural settlements have 
under 350 persons (Krambach and Muller, 1978). In Romania, villages of 
this size would be candidates for regrouping, but the East Germans have no 
such intention, planning in fact to develop further small settlements. To 
take a second example, we can note the planning ideology of British new 
towns where planners have most often sought to recreate a village in the 
city through family houses with garden plots (Foley, 1960). This strategy 
is the exact opposite of the Romanian ideology of converting villages into 
miniature cities. Although some of the technical arguments for 
concentration and urban orientation are generally valid, we must realize 
that these are grounded in ideological premises particularly germane to the 
Romanian planning conception (as opposed to planning in general or 
socialist planning). 
Citizen Participation in Romania is not just a right bUt a duty for 
each citizen. Participation consists of 4-6 days per year of voluntary 
work for which a cash payment can also be substituted. There can also be 
additional voluntary labor contributions or self-taxation for special 
projects, helping out during the collective farm's harvest, clerical work 
in the town hall, service on the local judicial commission, taking on 
animal contracting or working a lot on the collective farm. 
while some localities have higher priority for planners than others, 
all citizens must participate in implementing the plans for their 
localities, even if dissatisfied with them. The contradictions that arise 
are evident, and can be particularly acute for communities whcih are being 
phased out (see Gheorghe and Gheorghe, 1978; Dumitru, 1977; Matei and 
Matei, 1977). 
The development of Feldioara's plan shows constant expansion in. line 
with the ambitious pace of Romanian development. Where previous statements 
emphasized retaining traditional architecture, in President Ceau§escu's 
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call for new and revised plans in 1977, these sentiments were subordinated 
to the need for transforming the village center by constructing a central 
boulevard of four story apartments. This would mean more expropriations. 
The new plans also called for the replacement of the town hall with a grand 
administrative complex which would house all the village political and 
economic institutions, dominating it both spatially and politically. The 
existing main street would even have to circle around it instead of passing 
straight by. 
Particularly indicative of the planners' urban bias is the absence of 
state investment in local infrastructural improvements unconnected to 
apartments. Central heating, sewage, hot running water, asphalting, and 
telephones are available for the apartment dwellers in the center. The 
planners support this policy by saying that natural gas is too expensive 
and that the dispersed housing pattern of Feldioara makes installation of 
thermocentral and heating ducts "uneconomical." Thus, village houses will 
continue to be heated with wood, at least through 1990. The planners' 
conception of "economical" seems unduly rigid. Feldioara is, in fact, a 
highly nucleated village. This is one of the reasons it was selected for 
urbanization in the first place. Most houses are built adjacent to each 
other, literally wall to wall. If the installation of heating for 
villagers living in one-family houses would be rational anywhere, it would 
be rational in Feldioara. Despite this, and despite the desire of locals 
for central heating and their seeming ability to pay for it if the state 
would only make the initial infrastructure investments, there are no plans 
whatsoever to modernize the existing system of wood-heated tile ovens. The 
"general interest," no doubt, is served by providing the factory workers' 
apartments with the best possible facilities, but the planners' dogmatic 
ideology about what constitutes rational investment, a reflection of their 
social distance from local concerns, hardly aids in getting locals to see 
any tangible benefits in the urbanization plan for their community. 
Urban orientation and concentration ideology also underlie the 
"economically rational" plans for expropriation. As in renewal schemes 
everywhere, an individual cannot stand in the path of progress. However, 
often it is not just a house but a peasant household productive unit that 
is being destroyed. As a consequence a family of agricultural producers is 
turned into a family of consumers, thus increasing demands on local 
provisioning. 
General Constraints Upon National Planners' IdeOlogies 
National level planners, having already formulated and received a plan 
which reflects the constraints mentioned above, now introduce their own 
assumptions into its implementation. Especially important is the degree to 
which they adhere to the centralization and urban orientation ideologies in 
their decisions about settlement rationality. National level planners 
interpret the many directives differently. On the basis of identical 
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objective criteria, two similar villages may be determined to have 
different potential. Planners might favor economic criteria which demand 
rapid financial benefits over political criteria, sanctioning investment in 
backward areas. Planners with architectural backgrounds might dream of 
building private villas while those trained as engineers might stress more 
mundane, infrastructural improvement. Planners will have diverse or 
personal allegiances and values which they bring to the plan's formulation 
and eventual implementation. 
Three examples of planner ideology serve to illustrate how these 
constraints work in Feldioara's case. The first deals with the 
systematization law itself. Two of Bra~ov's highest ranking planners had 
diametrically opposed views of the systematization law. One planner 
thought the law, with its stipulation about zoning controls, mandatory 
vertical construction, and land use recommendations to be much too 
restrictive. The law limited innovation, avoided considering local 
variations, and tended to undervalue the real differences between 
settlements. This planner believed that the uniformity of the law would 
lead to inefficiency. Meanwhile, a close colleague thought the exact 
opposi teo He saw the law as a guiding force designed to "provide-
flexibility of action while assuring control over errors." Both these 
individuals held high ranking positions in the Bra§ov County planning 
offices, but the first was voicing his opinion as an architect, while the 
second was more a political leader who happened to be an architect. For 
planners working on the same project (as these two were), their differing 
perceptions of the law found expression during the extended debates over 
expropriation and reconstruction in Feldioara. Those planners with more 
confidence in the law's flexibility tended to advocate more ambitious 
proposals. 
A second example concerns planners' conceptions of the "socialist 
city." One planner insisted that the true socialist city was a city of 
apartments, collective residences that expressed socialist equality. The 
one-family house was a survival from the past, and it would be. 
systematically expropriated, to be relegated eventually to the periphery of 
cities. In contrast, his colleague supported the validity of the one-
family house as a residence type. Detached houses were ideal for young 
families with children, while apartments were best for housing childless 
families, pensioners, or single adults. One family houses should be 
retained, and one day, when the necessity of building apartments had 
passed, the state would begin to bUild villas too. These two views of the 
socialist city came into conflict when Feldioara's plan was revised in 
1977. Apparently, the former view won out, so that the new socialist 
Feldioara will contain a civic center of apartments. One-family houses 
often containing families who wish to maintain agrarian household economies 
will remain only at the edge of the village. 
A final example shows differing perceptions of urbanization on the 
part of planners and villagers. Villagers knew very little about the 
technical details of the plan. When asked about what was going to happen 
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in the future, they almost universally responded with "se face blocuri" 
(they'll build apartments). Planners, on the other hand, with complete 
knowledge of the plan, also responded in a very simple manner: use face 
industrie." For planners, the building of a factory was primary, while all 
else was secondary. For the villagers, urbanization meant apartments, and 
perhaps more services. These contrasting perceptions of urbanization 
affected the willingness of local Feldioarans to participate in the 
formation or execution of the plan. 
Regional Constraints on Planning Transformations 
In describing Romania's national planning policy we have already 
touched on the problem of regional competition. Despite Romania's attempts 
to alleviate regional disparities, differences between developed and 
underdeveloped regions remain high (Hoffman, 1967; Turnock, 1977). 
Planners from poor counties may agitate for extra investment from Bucharest 
using the political line of regional equality. Those from highly developed 
counties, meanwhile, may seek to retain their county's preferred position 
by invoking purely economic arguments of increased productivity and 
economies of scale. Under conditions of competition for investment, some 
counties are bound to feel cheated, thus, planners will be susceptible to 
charges of catering to regional interests, though "rotation of cadres" 
seeks to prevent the development of such allegiances. Systematization 
policy generates competition between individual localities, too, and it is 
the regional offices which must mediate this competition for scarce 
resources. 
Two other variables that affect the structure of the plan at regional 
levels are ethnicity and ecological diversity. Ethnic minorities in 
Romania are disproportionately distributed with regard to region and 
settlement type. The predominantly Hungarian counties of Covasna and 
Harghita, relatively backward though often mentioned as examples of 
progress in Romania's nationality policy, will receive new investments in 
extractive industry, infrastructure, forestry and tourism. The state 
fosters the idea that regional development policies reflect ethnic 
policies. This is a dOUble-edged sword, however, because when regional 
needs are subordinated to overall national priorities, the competition 
between developed and underdeveloped regions takes on ethnic overtones. 
The same ambiguity holds true for localities possessing German-
speaking populations, most of which are located in the industrialized 
counties of Timi~oara, Sibiu and Bra~ov. Historically German settlements 
in Transylvania have been large, .nucleated, multifunctional villages. 
These are now viewed by planners as ideally suited for development into 
small towns (if they have not already been declared towns). I would expect 
that the total number of Saxon villages to be urbanized would be 
considerably higher than the proportion of Saxon villages in the total 
rural network. 
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On the other hand, the reverse holds true for Gypsy villages, which 
are often small, dispersed, isolated, and neglected, a reflection of their 
pariah status in pre-war Romania. Existing concepts of planner rationality 
in Romania mean that these villages are prime candidates to be phased out. 
Though these decisions may be based on concrete economic, geographic or 
demographic criteria, this does not prevent them from being perceived by 
those affected in ethnic terms. 
Local planning schemes will also yield differential results because of 
ecological variation. The vast majority of villages to be phased out are 
in highland zones. These mountain hamlets ' differ from lowland villages not 
only in their geographic isolation and spatial dispersion but in their 
historical autonomy and noncollectivized household economies (Tufesco, 
1978). Though peopled largely by ethnic Romanians, the specified 
historical, ecological, and economic distinctions of mountain folk lend 
them a sort of ethnic consciousness much like that of genuine ethnic 
groups. Since several thousand mountain villages are to be phased out, 
with their residents moved to other locations (especially to new towns), we 
can expect unforeseen social ramifications in these technical plans, 
especially if the more autonomous mountain populations misinterpret 
ultimately beneficial state policies as attacks on their traditional 
existence (Gheorghe and Gheorghe, 1978). 
county planners, officials, and party activists have important roles 
in formulating, revising, executing, and monitoring the plan in the local 
community. Still, they usually have little attachment to the immediate 
region in which they work, having been assigned to their areas on the basis 
of national priorities, often shifted in their jobs at state initiative or 
on the basis of their own desire for more lucrative posts elsewhere; Being 
responsible for several communities at once, they have "little time to 
develop ties with specific localities and they depend on local leaders for 
their information. Regional planners can also be short tempered in dealing 
with local villagers who may possess less expertise or less education, or 
who may just be difficult to work with. 
As Romania's most urbanized and industrialized region, Bra~ov County 
(where Feldioara is located), presents a fine example of how regional 
constraints operate to transform the planning process •. With developed 
infrastructure and heavy industry present even before the Communist Party 
took power, Bra§ov benefitted further from extensive state investment 
throughout the post-war period. This has led to an urban proportion of the 
county of over 70%, which is nearly twice the national average, and a 60% 
rise in the population of the capital, Bra~ov City, over the last ten 
years, to nearly 300,000. 
With this development have come noticeable side effects: pollution 
from factories located in the city area (which is constricted due to being 
surrounded on three sides by mountains); immigration of young industrial 
workers who live in singles' dormitories; a press on available housing and 
services not just by residents but also by temporary undocumented migrants, 
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and by commuters who seek a home in the city where they work (Sampson, 
1979). 
Seeing this, some county planners have complained that Bra~ov's 
preferred status is slipping and they are calling for renewed inputs. 
Others, citing the side effects and social consequences, feel that further 
industrialization should be halted. These planners want more investment in 
consumer goods, services, and housing for the expanded population. While 
the county will indeed receive very little 'new investment in the coming 
Five Year Plan, this is overshadowed by the expansion of already developed 
enterprises; for example, the Red Flag truck factory will be augmented by 
6,000 workers to 26,000. Because investment decisions are made at national 
ministry levels, Bra§ov County planners are at a disadvantage. While they 
can contest such decisions, as when they pleaded successfully for 
additional service investments during President Ceau§escu's visit to the 
city in the summer of 1977, they themselves cannot make these decisions. 
To actively protest further investment would be a manifestation of the 
particular (regional) interest over the general (national) interest. Here 
planners would be entering sensitive political territory. 
The urbanization plans for Bra§ov County also reveal instances of 
local competition, especially true when the 7 future towns were being 
selected from among the county's 150 villages. To take one example, 
residents of village J. protest when they found out that nearby L. had been 
designated a future urban center and thus would receive new investments in 
infrastructure, services, and housing. Whenever planners visited J., the 
villagers would plead with them to change their decision. The villagers 
maintained that since J. was already the commune center (a "commune" being 
a group of 1-7 villages with one village--usually the largest--designated a 
"commune center"), and L. only an adjoining village, that J. had prior 
claim to new town status. Eventually, the decision was changed, although 
rumors in the County Planning Office circulated that one particular staff 
member, having been born in village J., had used additional influence. 
While this is only a single example, I suspect that such local competition 
and jealousy prevails generally, especially in view of the focused 
investments that the preferred localities receive. In Bra~ov County, for 
example, just three new towns being developed for the 1976-1980 plan 
receive 30% of all rural investments in the county. 
Local competition also manifests itself in the timetable for Bra~ov 
County's development. Initial plans gave priority to the development of 
the more backward regions in the west and northwest. In these zones, the 
new towns would function as administrative and service centers for 
surrounding villages. SUbsequently, however, the ordering was reversed, 
and development of the more service-center villages was postponed to the 
post-1980 or post-l985 period. By early 1979, new directives from 
Bucharest stated that only those villages with genuine economic potential 
should be developed. The list of new towns was changed again; the village 
of cr., mentioned above, was dropped, as were two other villages in the 
underdeveloped western zone, thus maintaining, if not increasing, the 
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regional inequalities between the area around Bra~ov City (where four new 
towns are to be developed) and the outlying hinterlands. At the county 
level, we see that national priority is given to growth and accumulation 
over regional equality and nonproductive investment. Again, either 
investment decision (hinterland versus already developed) could have been 
justified on economic grounds. The fact was that these decisions reflected 
political and ideological priorities as well. 
Aside from the 7 future towns, Bra~ov County also has 10 villages 
which will be regrouped or phased out: each has a population of about 250 
persons. County planners realize the sensitivity of these actions, and 
they are basically pursuing a policy of "benign neglect," approaching 
inertia, hoping to let the process proceed through natural outmigration and 
depopulation, rather than through administrative action. 
The "ethnic factor" is also reflected in the urbanization plans for 
Bra10v County. Two of the three new towns scheduled for 1980 are former 
Saxon villages, as are two other villages scheduled for development in the 
post-1980 phase. On more than one occasion, regional officials have 
mentioned to me that Saxon villages are well-suited for development because 
of the Saxons' historical propensity for hard work and community endeavor, 
which is necessary when state policies need citizens' participation in plan 
execution. 
Of the ten villages to be phased out, four are Gypsy settlements. One 
of these is Cutus, whose residents will probably be moved into Feldioara. 
It is regrettable that Feldioara's plan mentions no special measures to be 
taken in this matter, though friction is bound to arise as several hundred 
Gypsies are moved into an overcrowded village-town. 
In one respect, however, the county planners have paid special 
attention to the Gypsies. In 1976, the Gypsies were exempted from the law 
requiring them to build houses of two stories. Planners in Bra~ov even 
designed special house plans, euphemistically called casa simplu, which 
were actually meant for Gypsies. Unfortunately, subsequent calls to expand 
planning activities and increase vigilance in adhering to the systematiza-
tion law led to a voiding of the dispensation. No matter, the Gypsies had 
never asked for the plans anyway. 
After having been filtered through the constraints of general 
planning, socialist planning, specific Romanian features, and after having 
been sUbjected to the ideologies of both national planners and their 
counterparts at regional levels, the plan now passes to the locality. The 
village elites--those heading political, economic and cultural 
institutions--transmit the plan from above, mobilize the population to 
achieve it, monitor its progress and feed information back to higher 
bUreaucratic levels. 
The local elite is first and foremost the local-level representative 
of state power and only secondarily the locality's representative to the 
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state. Thus, the principal duty of local elites is not to articulate 
citizen discontent bUt to alleviate it, by mObilizing the population to 
achieve goals predetermined by the "general interest." Local elites act as 
brokers between village and state: they control access to resources, 
information, and regional networks, sometimes trying to foster the 
impression that they control more than they actually do (Cole, 1979). Seen 
from abOve, the elites are judged on how successfully they mobilize 
citizens to achieve the plan. 
The success of elites in mobilizing citizens is greatly dependent on 
the degree to which they are integrated into the community. Factors 
inhibiting integration are well known bOth to Romanian social scientists 
and to villagers. Romania's technical, administrative, and intellectual 
cadres are distributed around the countryside according to nationally 
determined priorities. Inevitably, most are sent to localities where they 
are unknown, to underdeveloped zones when they would rather be in 
metropolitan areas, to villages when they would rather be in towns. 
Government efforts to aid in integrating local elites into the communities 
have been only partially successful because certain regions contribute 
disproportionately to the number of educated cadres. As it stands today, 
many local elites aSsigned to rural localities intend to move away when 
they can. Others refuse to actually move to the village to which they have 
been assigned, preferring to remain in the nearest town and commute. Even 
collective farm engineers and village mayors, two posts which demand 
intimate knowledge of local conditions, have been known to commute to rural 
jObS from the city, much to the dismay of county newspapers and local 
villagers. V. Miftode's study of Ia~i County (1978), for example, reports 
that more than two-thirds of the rural cadres are immigrants or commuters. 
In one commune (Letca), the villagers complained that all the 
intelligentsia returned to Iasi at night. Miftode understates the problem 
when he cites the "dysfunctions" in carrying out political, social, and 
cultural activities in such communities (p. 163). 
Of course, not all local elites come from outside. Locally born and 
respected individuals are either voted or drafted into responsible 
positions with the intention that their multiplex social ties will help 
mobilize the population and thus fulfill state programs. Yet there are 
special constraints on locally bOrn elites,' too. Their combined local 
legitimacy and state authority leads villagers to expect more of them than 
they can possibly deliver. If local elites treat everyone equally, in 
bureaucratic fashion, they risk alienating the primary social networks on 
whom they depend. Conversely, an overindulgence with respect to these kin 
networks can lead to factionalism, corruption or general suspicion. Unlike 
elites who are not actually living in the village, locally bOrn cadres 
will be affected in the plan directly: thus, like other villagers, they 
will do what they can to mold the plan in ways beneficial to themselves and 
their immediate households. From the planners' point of view, however, 
locally bOrn elites may be less educated, more difficult to deal with, 
perhaps too provincial. Still, as long as locally bOrn elites feel that 
they themselves and their constituents are being served by the plan, their 
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mobilization ability will be more effective, their access to information 
better, and their feedback of higher quality than that provided by 
commuting elites. 
An examination of Feldioara's local elites shows their mobilization 
ability to be limited by their lack of integration into the community. 
This is complicated by the continuous immigration of industrial workers so 
that not just elites, but entire segements of the population are more or 
less strangers to one another. The immigrant stream in Feldioara began 
soon after the war, with the coming of refugees and mountain colonists who 
took over lands of expropriated Saxon-German households. As Bra~ov city 
industrialized, Feldioara became a way-station for workers unable to get 
housing in the city but who still commuted there daily. In the meantime, 
Feldioara's German residents, who could have served as transitional elites 
in the new order, were shipped to labor camps in the USSR in 1945. While 
many eventually returned, in the mid-1960's they began to emigrate to West 
Germany. Thus, Feldioara's absolute population has not just grown by about 
1500 individuals, but there has been a further population replacement of 
another 500 people. In 1976, at least one-third of the adult population 
were immigrants, and this proportion has grown since then. In one-fourth 
of Feldioara's families, both spouses were immigrants. 
Immigration has had its effect on the cadres of local elites. 
virtually all of them are migrants or commuters: mayor, vice mayor, head of 
the consumers' cooperative, cooperative farm engineer (head of the 
collective farm until 1976), school principal, police chief, party youth 
leader, priest, and doctor. While locals have recently gotten jobs as 
school vice principal, held the vice mayorship for a few years, or become 
head of the collective farm, these individuals were overshadowed by the 
continuing stream of new cadres, skilled engineers, and factory personnel 
whose needs had high priority. Regional planners in Brafoov began to have 
special problems with Feldioara when the highly skilled factory engineers, 
intelligentsia, technicians, and clerical staff refused to move there, 
preferring to commute from Bra~ov. These people were protesting the low 
quality of services, poor provisioning, and inadequate educational 
opportunities for their children. 
The lack of social integration between elites and citizens was one 
cause for nonfulfillment of village plans. In 1975, for example, the 
village leaders were castigated by the county First Secretary for not 
having completed the culture house on time. The leaders were simply unable 
to get out the requisite voluntary labor or to collect enough donations1 
it would be another two and a half years before the culture house was 
finally finished. 
Political shifts have been the rule in Fe1dioara. From 1972 to 1979 
the office of mayor changed hands no less than five times, with one man 
having held the office twice. None of the four mayors was locally born, 
and only one had lived in the village before he was appointed (and 
eventually nominated and elected; four of the five changes took place 
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between elections). Elites were not so often demoted as they were shifted 
around. A former head of the collective farm was previously a mayor. 
Another former mayor currently heads the consumers' cooperative, though he 
lacks any commercial experience. Two recently deposed mayors received jObs 
in Bra90v enterprises. Unsubstantiated rumor has it that the most recently 
deposed mayor had actually been sent to Feldioara as punishment for similar 
malfeasance in another town. The current mayor of Feldioara had lived all 
his life in Bra~ov City, but is married to the daughter of a local citizen.' 
He has since moved into the village. The marriage link was one factor 
influencing locals in proposing this individual to be mayor and was cited 
by county officials when he was officially appointed. 
Of Feldioara's nine village deputies, five are immigrants. Feldioara 
has had several party activists over the years each of whom was rotated 
after between 6 to 9 months. All came from Bra~ov and commuted to the 
village. In 1977, Feldioara obtained its own post of "local party activist 
responsible for ideological and propoganda activities." This individual is 
an unmarried immigrant woman and has few social links she can count on for 
support. 
Regional party activists have had conflicts with local elites because 
of the special demands placed on the latter. A case study of an 
expropriation illustrates the conflicts involved among the various kinds of 
leaders: 
An old widow was refusing to relinquish her garden for the 
construction of a veterinary clinic in the village. She was 
so adamant about not giving ~p her garden that she 
threatened to lie down in front of the bulldozer if it came 
into her courtyard. The mayor, an immigrant who had lived 
in the village for some years, discussed the case with the 
party activist from Bra~ov, who usually spent 2 or 3 days a 
week in Feldioara, especially during harvest time. The 
mayor outlined the case to the activist, explaining that 
they had called the woman's family into the town hall to 
have them convince her to move but she still refused. The 
activist saw no real problem. 'The law is the law,' he 
said, 'and we can't let this old woman stand in the way of 
progress. She will have to move and that's that.' The 
mayor was rather hesitant. 'What are people going to say 
about a mayor who lets a woman lie down in front of a 
bulldozer?' The activist insisted that there was no choice 
but to remove the woman physically. The mayor, not knowing 
what to do, delegated this task to the vice-mayor, a well 
known and well-respected native of Feldioara. The vice-
mayor, after considerable wrangling, was able to convince 
the woman's family to get her to give up her plot. In 
return she received a garden double the previous size. 
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A second example of the local elites' dilemma deals with the situation 
of private homes in Feldioara. As stated above, modernized heating 
facilities are to be provided in all the apartments, which mostly house 
workers for the new factory, as well as some village administrative 
personnel. However, a few houses lying nearest the apartment complex have 
been granted the right to connect to the heating system if they defray the 
costs for the connection. These individuals, all occupying new homes on 
land given them by the local peoples' council, happen to include the vice 
mayor, the school vice principal, doctors, a policeman and a restaurant 
manager~ These individuals have benefitted directly from the plan without 
contesting it. Though all respected families, they are now the focus of 
rumors about how they were able to manipulate the plan. There is no 
indication of wrong doing, but the envy of the other villagers has been 
felt, and the mobilization potential of these individuals has been reduced. 
In addition, a change in the placement of apartments has meant that 
some individuals whose vegetable gardens would have been expropriated are 
now exempt, whereas others were abruptly told that next week construction 
would be starting in their back yards. It appears once again that one of 
the lucky persons whose garden was exempted was a high local official. 
This caused some bad feeling from those whose gardens were added to the 
expropriation list. 
Local Level Constraints 
It is important to stress that the plan does not affect "the village" 
as a whole, but rather affects different individuals and their families in 
different ways. Those subject to expropriation and those whose physical 
environment undergoes rapid change express one response, while those at the 
village periphery, those moving in as temporary residents, or those in 
elite positions will have other responses. These range from enthusiasm to 
apathy to resistance. Response to the plan can be measured through an 
individual's record of meeting attendance, voluntary labor contributions or 
involvement in controversies over expropriation and contracting. 
The chief constraint on the locals' ability to transform the plan is 
the planners' initial decision about the locality's future. Is the 
community irrational and therefore doomed to benign neglect? Is it to be 
maintained provisionally at the existing level? Or is it one of the lucky 
150 model villages or 300 future towns which receive state investment? The 
incident of villages J. and L. in Bra90v County, described above, shows that 
a village's future can be changed given sufficient community solidarity and 
(perhaps) a link to the regional structure. Similarly, the village's 
historical relation to central authority will also constrain the plan's 
implementation. At one extreme is the autonomous, economically distinct 
mountain village; at the other, the suburban village with a long history of 
urban social and economic ties. In any case, relations between communities. 
depend a great deal on the planners' initial decisions. What were once 
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egalitarian relations between villages dissolve if one of them is chosen as 
a future central place. 
Taking the internal social structure (and forgetting momentarily about 
the local elites), local class composition will reveal the categories of 
people who stand to benefit most by the plan. One could expect that 
families who are still carrying out some household domestic agriculture 
will be threatened by future urbanization, whereas worker families might 
stand to benefit. Those residing in the community temporarily, e.g., those 
waiting to migrate to the city with no long term interest in settling 
there, would very likely be indifferent to the plan. Local ethnic 
differences and ethnic perceptions also structure how the plan is received, 
especially if it appears to be affecting one group more adversely than 
another. 
In Feldioara, the history of plan formulation--the lack of information 
and the stop-and-go nature of the planning process--and the activities of 
the planners all led to a dampening of local enthusiasm for the plan. 
Apartment houses and their many immigrant occupants have generated mixed 
emotions among the other villagers, who see little immediate gain from the 
coming of urbanization. Immigrants are unified only in the sense that they 
are not locals. They have not arrived en masse from a particular locality 
and know each other only through their work and the common loneliness they 
face in the apartments. Many will eventually leave Feldioara, feeling the 
villagers to have been unduly hostile to them, while others will settle in 
the village provisionally if they can buy a house. 
The actors at the village level are households and individuals. They 
pursue their various "strategies," both short term and long term, economic 
and social, personal and familial. However, these strategies are flexible 
and need not conflict directly with the plan. Ideally, from the planners' 
point of view, the individual's short term strategies "harmonize" with the 
state's general interests as, for example, when high state buying prices 
stimulate peasants to produce. The problem is that the constraints of 
planning, as it passes down from one structure to another, generate 
contradictory goals and opposing strategies, appealing to diverse 
ideologies. 
The Village and the Plan 
The implementation of the plan seems capr~c~ous at times to the local 
villagers. Some of the expropriations have been handled in a heavy handed 
manner, where citizens got only very short notice that their gardens or 
lands would be taken and received unclear information on how much of 
their plots they could retain. With the constant revision of the plan, and 
with a discontinuous cadre of individuals in the highest offices, there is 
a problem of information even for the leaders. When abrupt changes come, 
as ~hey did in 1977, no one had a sound base of information on which to 
judge the changes except the mayor, who has subsequently been replaced. 
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Feldioara's population has grown by more than a thousand in the past 
years, while the number of stores and services has remained constant. This 
has produced more pressure on individuals to obtain resources such as food 
(meat, eggs, chickens, milk for children), while simultaneously some 
traditional food producing homesteads have been expropriated. The 
immigrants, meanwhile, are totally dependent on buying consumer goods and 
have no local kin networks to fall back on. The factory director becomes 
their patron and their advocate. 
As in most of Romania's ethnically mixed villages, the Saxon minority 
occupies the original center with Romanians and Gypsies on the edges. 
Saxons are being inordinately affected by the plan, both positively and 
negatively. They are affected positively in that the changes are more 
visible to them and more available; they will be the first to receive 
piped-in water, sewage and heating ducts, and asphalted streets, all 
because they live in the center; they are affected negatively in that they 
are subject to expropriation since their large houses cannot compete with 
the rationality of an apartment building that can hold 30 families on the 
same size lot. Saxons perceive the plan as yet another attempt by 
Romanians to gain the upper hand, by literally wiping out their homes, one 
by one. This is regrettable because local participation is still a key 
factor in implementing the plan and in creating a positive atmosphere for 
future changes. Saxon traditions of hard work and community activity have 
always played an important role in village cooperative efforts. For 
example, if one examines the records for voluntary contributions which 
adult villagers are liable for, 4-6 days' work per year, or a payment of 
125-200 lei, it appears that Saxons have had a much higher tendency to work 
off their time in labor, while Romanians and Gypsies generally choose to 
pay the cash fine. The poor mobilization for the construction of 
Feldioara's culture house and several other projects (accomplished only 
after local officials went from house to house) shows the urgency of the 
problem and the contradictions generated by the need for participation when 
the participants are skeptical of the activity's final goal. 
Villagers express considerable pessimism about the existing state of 
affairs in Feldioara. They realize that this is a period of transition 
from a large village to a small town. Still, they complain of 
overcrowding, standing in line, inadequate services, lack of politeness, 
"crime in the streets," thievery, vagabonds, and so on. The unmarried 
construction workers at the factory have at times been on a warlike footing 
with village youths over local women. Migrants complain that village 
agrarian households won't sell them food products even for hard cash. 
Though many of these skilled technicians, SUb-engineers and functionaries 
are highly qualified, the locals refer to them as "gypsies" or as 
irresponsibles who live in the misery of the still unfinished apartments. 
The atmosphere is one of mutual suspicion rather than mere curiosity. It 
is hardly conducive to community endeavor. Stereotypes between the long-
time locals and young immigrants abound. The immigrants know little about 
the village; they have hardly been off the main street. Some believe 
Feldioara to be largely Saxon, whereas Saxons do not make up even 20% of 
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the population. The planners' "factory-first" policy and the unstable 
composition of the local leadership keeps the community off balance. 
How does one explain the poor leadership, weak mobilization, 
indiscipline and skepticism that are cited so often by local leaders and 
citizens, and in newspaper articles? As I have tried to indicate, I do not 
think this is purely a matter of Feldioara's local history or sheer bad 
luck. Nor do I think that "good leadership" is the result of a unified 
cadre of skilled, highly motivated leaders in a setting which welcomes 
newcomers of all kinds. Instead, I believe that the general case of 
Feldioara, together with the other examples cited, illustrates how the 
structural aspects of planning and the interaction between planning 
processes and local social processes tell us more abOut the community than 
if we concentrated purely on its idiosyncratic "history." Thus, the 
incidents of poor leadership, indiscipline, and inadquate mobilization must 
be explained as much by the nature of socialist planning in Romania and the 
actions of the planners, as by activities in the local setting. 
Conclusion 
My comparison of Romania's planning ideology with the realities of its 
execution should in no way be interpreted as condemnation of Romanian 
socialism or socialist planning. On the contrary, one would be hard-
pressed to find ANY development strategy--socialist or otherwise--whose 
high-sounding pronouncements had not been deflated by cold, hard facts. 
In attempting to show that planning "dysfunctions" originate not so 
much from local causes but from constraints in the planning structure, 
transformations in planning ideology and contradictions in the plan's 
execution, I have implied that what goes on in the village of Feldioara 
goes on in other villages as welL In this sense, I have constructed a 
rather determinist argument. This naturally leads to questions such as, 
"Could it have happened any other way?", "Is there no room for choice?", or 
"Can politicians, planners or citizens ever, act to consciously prevent 
inherent contradictions from arising?" 
To all these questions my answer is a conditional "yes," depending 
upon the degree to which we accept the planning structure as a given. This 
paper, focusing synchronically on planning policy and its execution, has 
done just that. I avoided an explicitly political discussion of just how 
specific options came to dominate the planning structure in the first 
place. I did not examine the question of who determines the top 
priorities, who sets the long and short-term goals, and who has the last 
word on what means will be employed to achieve these goals. Had I included 
such an overtly political analysis of national decision-making, however, my 
ostensibly determinist conclusions abOut Romanian planning would have 
revealed that political and ideological choices are constantly being made--
choices abOut priorities, ends, means and timetables. Exercising specific 
choices can help ease the constraints on planning structure, foresee the 
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transformations in this structure, prevent or alleviate the inevitable 
"dysfunctions." That Romanian planning is, by and large, moving forward 
indicates that many correct choices are indeed being made! 
To those who would insist that Romania's plans (or socialist planning 
in general) are formulated by "rational" consideration of "objective 
needs" and "historical necessities," I can only point to the concrete 
realities of "das real existierenden Socialismus" (after Bahro, 1977). No 
matter where we look, we find that every "historical necessity" began as a 
political line, and that policies invoked in the name of "objective needs" 
have been abruptly reversed, and in some cases denounced as "voluntarist 
deviations." 
By analyzing the overt politics of plan formulation and combining this 
with empirical study of planning structure, ideologies, transformations and 
execution, we can generate concrete suggestions (choices) to help Romania's 
planners achieve their goals of increased material and social welfare for 
the entire population. Using the urbanization of Feldioara as an example, 
let me list some of the possible choices: 
Had planners been able to alleviate the problem of social 
and administ.rative distance and make more information 
available to the citizens, local leaders would have been 
better able to inform and consult with their constituents. 
Had the policy favoring industrial over "nonproductive" 
investment been reversed, Feldioara might have been able to 
demand and receive more services and utilities so that the 
locals could see tangible benefits from urbanization instead 
of viewing it as apartment construction. 
Had Romanian conceptions of settlement rationality not been 
so strictly applied, the peasants could have been supported 
in building their traditional one-family homes instead of 
being forced to bUild two-story giants or receiving notice 
of expropriation. 
Had the amorphous "general interest" been moderated so as to 
allow for genuine regional competition, to recognize the 
politics of unproductive investment in backward regions and 
to accept the social limits on industrialization in advanced 
regions, regional balance would not be such a volatile 
issue. The same could be said about reducing the hectic 
pace of Romania's development. 
Had regional competition and interests been institutional-
ized as part of the planning process instead of having been 
condemned as retrograde "particular interest," more enlight-
ened decisions could have been made to, resolve the contra-
dictions between rapid accumulation and regional inequality. 
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Had the plan allowed more regional and local self-
determination in planning execution, perhaps the regional, 
ethnic and ecological variability could have been dealt with 
in a more creative manner, and national-level planners could 
have spent more time on truly national-level concerns. 
Had infrastructural improvements been made in the village, 
they might have become more attractive to the intelligentsia 
who are assigned there, so that instead of doing all they 
could to leave the village, they would have used their 
abilities to better social links with the residents and 
foster citizen mobilization. 
Had state policy recognized local competition between 
individual settlements and viewed local leaders as spokesmen 
for local interests rather than as executors of state power, 
i.e., had their plans been truly local plans, the local 
leaders would have retained more legitimacy and better 
mobilization abilities, and their flexibility would have 
been hailed instead of condemned as "poor leadership." 
And, finally, had planners been cognizant of the social 
structural ramifications of urbanization policies, they 
would have foreseen some of the undesirable consequences of 
urbanization in Feldioara and could have increased efforts 
to generate a degree of community spirit. 
Thus, the essential question is not whether or not the plan was 
fulfilled. Rather, we must ask, "For whom was it fulfilled," and even more 
importantly, "Why thi~ plan and not another?" There is no overriding 
"objective force" in this process; we can pinpoint no clear determinants. 
Instead, this paper has tried to reveal the constraints structuring the 
range of action. without knowledge of these constraints, it is impossible 
to construct a theory of social change or social process. Reiterating Joan 
Vincent's plea, we must not just bridge the gap between local and 
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